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Abstract
This article investigates discrimination and the interplay of residential and ethnic stigma
on the French housing market using two different methods, paired-testing audit study of real
estate agencies and face-to-face interviews with real estate agents. The juxtaposition of their
findings leads to a paradox: interviews reveal high levels of ethnic discrimination but little to
none residential discrimination, while the audit study shows that living in deprived suburbs is
associated with a lower probability of obtaining an appointment for a housing vacancy but eth-
nic origin (signaled by the candidate’s name) has no significant discriminatory effect. We have
three priors potentially consistent with this apparent paradox and re-evaluate their likelihood
in light of these findings: (i) agents make use of any statistical information about insolvency,
including residency; (ii) there are two distinct and independent taste discriminations, one about
space and one about ethnicity; (iii) these two dimensions exist and complement each other.
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Introduction
Ethnic minorities are often concentrated in underprivileged neighborhoods in Western societies (John-
ston, Poulsen and Forrest, 2007; Musterd, 2005; Peach, Robinson and Smith, 1981). Emanating from
discriminatory processes, ethnic segregation may also lead in turn to “residential traps” that affect mi-
nority populations’ socioeconomic achievements, from access to education to economic success and the
building of social networks (Crane, 1991; Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley, 2002).
While there is a wide range of literature on the cumulative aspect of residential and ethnic/racial
inequalities in the United States (Denton and Massey, 1993; Wilson, 1978, 1987), the interaction between
ethnic and residential stigma has seldom been analyzed in audit studies on housing discrimination; to our
knowledge, the only exception is a study of the credit market by Ross and Yinger (2002).1
Chronic urban riots in the French banlieues in 2005 once again raised the question of ethnic minorities
in France (Waddington, Jobard and King, 2013), and yet urban studies carried out in France rarely con-
sider ethnicity in general and ethnic discrimination in the housing market in particular. Some exceptions
can be found in the form of recent works providing evidence of both residential and ethnic discrimination;
these are reviewed below. By “residential discrimination” we mean discriminatory decisions precisely
oriented against the ability of individuals to choose their residential area. This practice has been explicitly
illegal in France since 14 December 2013: residential discrimination is the 20th criterion for assessing
whether discrimination against individuals has taken place.2
France is an interesting case to study discrimination because the country ostensibly promotes a color-
blind ideal of race relations (Sabbagh and Peer, 2008; Safi, 2008; Simon, 2008). For instance, the French
Republican model forcefully rejects ethnicity, culture, and religion as a basis for political organization,
claims-making, and even as the basis of categories for official statistics. Ethnicity per se is therefore
not reported in any public-sector statistical survey in France, which makes it difficult for race-based
affirmative action to be enforced and for inequality to be documented through representative data.
In light of the above, our article aims at analyzing the relationship between ethnic origin (specifically
North African descent) and residential origin (residency in a deprived neighborhood), in a potentially dis-
criminatory interaction in the housing market in France. Our goal is to explore how ethnic and residential
stigma can be disentangled in the measurement of discrimination by analyzing practices and discourses
relating to the overlap between these two criteria. To this end, we employ two methodological designs:
• An experimental paired-testing audit study, in the tradition of statistical analyses of discrimination,
which aims to measure the interaction of ethnic and residential effects.
• A qualitative study, based on interviews with real-estate agents who were asked open-ended ques-
1The link between racial and spatial stigma has been explored more frequently in qualitative research; see for instance
Kirschenman and Neckerman (1991).
2It should be noted that residential location in deprived and segregated areas has also considerable legal socioeconomic
consequences, well documented in the urban literature, undermining people’s life chances in terms of education, health,
employment, etc.
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tions about the selection process for housing applicants.3
Each method has its own advantages and limitations. While the audit study actually measures the effect
which the two dimensions have on discrimination, it does not detail the mechanisms underlying ethnic
and residential stigma. Conversely, face-to-face interviews provide discursive evidence on discrimination
and describe its underlying micro-social processes, but do not assess the magnitude of discriminatory
practices. The complementary use of both methods helps overcome the shortcomings of each. In fact,
the juxtaposition of our audit and interview findings leads to a double paradox:
1. Although real estate agents believe ethnic discrimination to be widespread, it is not statistically
significant in an audit study that controls for residential origin but it is when residential origin is
not controlled for.
2. Although real-estate agents do not mention residential discrimination, the audit findings suggest
that it is statistically significant.
This article analyzes this discrepancy highlighted in many studies of discrimination between discourses
and practices, and attempts to provide interpretations of it. We first review the research background and
present our two sets of findings, and then we attempt to decode the double paradox that emerges from
them. We then review the various hypotheses consistent with these findings that may help us explain the
paradox.
1 The relationship between residence-based and ethnic discrimina-
tion in housing: Background and hypotheses
1.1 Space and ethnicity in discrimination studies
There is now extensive sociological and economic literature showing, through survey results, that residen-
tial location has a significant effect on employment, education and crime, among other things (Brueckner
and Zenou, 2003; Fernandez and Su, 2004; Sampson and Sharkey, 2008). Despite the well-documented
role played by segregation and residential location in the production and perpetuation of inequality, the
concept of “residential discrimination” has seldom been used and its effect is rarely measured in au-
dit studies on discrimination. Conversely, ethnic and racial discrimination in American cities has been
measured with audit studies for more than three decades (Committee on National Statistics, 2002, 2004;
Fix and Struyk, 1993). These studies regularly document the unequal treatment disadvantaging ethnic
and racial minorities at various stages in the housing search on both the rental and ownership markets
(Turner et al., 2013). The 2012 study by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
3The agents audited are not necessarily the same as those interviewed, and we will explain why this is not of consequence
below.
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showed in particular that, of all ethnic groups, Hispanics face the highest levels of discrimination on the
rental market (followed by Blacks and Asians); for example, they become aware of roughly 12% fewer of
the housing units available than white housing applicants when they contact real-estate agents to inquire
about recently advertised properties.
Comparisons of the HUD’s findings over time show that although “blatant” discrimination has de-
clined, with minority applicants now less likely to have a door slammed in their faces, overall unequal
treatment remains high because of more subtle forms of discrimination. For example, minority applicants
are more likely to be told that they must talk to a lender before being shown an advertised home for sale,
whereas a white tester is more likely to meet with the agents without being asked about prequalification.
This changing framing of discriminatory practices challenges the methods which pair-testing studies have
traditionally used to measure discrimination and requires more attention to several details in the nature
and quality of the interactions between the testers and the audited agencies or landlords.
Finally, in the majority of studies, evidence on ethnic and racial discrimination is interpreted as being
related to conscious motivations and taste-based mechanisms.4 This is corroborated by some findings on
ethnic and racial neighborhood preferences highlighting whites’ unwillingness to live in neighborhoods
with a high proportion of ethnic minorities, particularly African Americans (Charles, 2009). Finally, in
an audit similar to ours, Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) find that male applicants on the rental market
with a Swedish name are much more likely to be called back than those with Arab names; evidence for
female applicants is less categorical.
1.2 Review of discrimination and immigration studies in the French context
Studies such as those cited above have rarely been conducted in France, and research on ethnic segre-
gation and discrimination in the area of housing has emerged only recently there. Most scholars have
analyzed ethnic segregation as being directly linked to “color-blind” market mechanisms of social strat-
ification. Recent studies challenge this, however, showing that ethnic segregation is more prevalent than
socioeconomic segregation and that it decreases very slowly (Préteceille, 2009; Rathelot and Safi, 2014;
Safi, 2009; Verdugo, 2011). French government statistics on housing also document considerable inequal-
ity between natives and immigrants. Such inequality occurs with regard to not only housing access and
tenure, but also housing quality, in terms of factors such as amenities and apartment size (Barou, 2002;
Breem, 2009). The immigrants’ housing situation is particularly disadvantaged for non-Europeans and
is resistant to standard socioeconomic controls, suggesting underlying ethnic discrimination. In a recent
comprehensive survey on immigration and discrimination, first- and second-generation immigrants were
shown to report twice as much discrimination in housing access as natives of non-immigrant background
(Pan Ké Shon and Scodellaro, 2011; Safi and Simon, 2014). Controlling for socioeconomic variables
suggests that ethnic or racial discrimination may, at least partly, be at play. In the same survey (TeO), the
4Taste-based discrimination still seems to be a major mechanism explaining persisting unequal treatment toward African
Americans in the US labor market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004).
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majority of respondents reported that this discrimination was based on skin color, ethnic origin, national-
ity or religion. Some ethno-racial discrimination has also been reported by qualitative studies on public
housing in France (Pala, 2005; Tissot, 2005). However, at present, studies assessing for ethno-racial dis-
crimination on the private housing market are extremely rare. Some limited evidence may be found in
an audit study carried out by the Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Egalité,
according to which Africans are four times less likely to be selected to rent an apartment compared with
their paired French white candidates (HALDE, 2006).
There is, however, well-established evidence of discrimination in the French labor market (Duguet
et al., 2010; Duguet, L’Horty and Petit, 2011). One of the most comprehensive audit studies, conducted
jointly by the ministry of labor and the International Labour Organization, shows that, four times out
of five, employers prefer mainstream candidates to strictly identical candidates of African immigrant
background (Cediey and Foroni, 2008). Research on ethnic discrimination in the labor market also pro-
vides evidence of “residential” discrimination. For instance, job applicants have lower interview rates
when their curriculum vita provides an address indicating a poor suburb. The Cediey’s and Foroni’s audit
findings also indicate that living in a poor suburb per se undermines employability. Their explanatory
hypotheses draw on unobserved characteristics that employers may infer from the candidate’s residential
location (dependability, work ethic), or other observable contextual characteristics that may affect pro-
ductivity (transportation connectivity to inner cities, crime, etc). Wasmer and Zenou (2002) provide a
model of urban equilibrium unemployment where access to employment is negatively linked to distance
between residential location and jobs due to information loss, employer’s discrimination or connectivity
of public transportation networks. Gobillon, Rupert and Wasmer (2014) point out the important role
played by commuter distances and housing frictions in the employment pathways of minority workers,
relative to the majority, in France. Statistical studies have also documented a significant effect of residen-
tial location on job-finding (Duguet, L’Horty and Sari, 2009; Gobillon, Magnac and Selod, 2011), and
have related these findings to the spatial mismatch literature. This body of research raises the question of
the existence of discrimination against residential origin in France and the extent to which it may interact
with ethnic discrimination.
France’s emerging racial question is linked to the post-colonial nature of a considerable proportion
of its immigration. While Europeans constitute the majority of first- and second-generation immigrants
in France, the most recent waves increasingly come from former French colonies (Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia and sub-Saharan Africans, mainly for Francophone West Africa) (INSEE, 2012). There is grow-
ing empirical evidence to suggest that North Africans (also referred to as Arabs or Maghrebi) and sub-
Saharan Africans are the most disadvantaged groups in regard to socio-economic position and labor
market outcomes, residential segregation, law and justice, health, etc. (Meurs, Pailhé and Simon, 2006;
Safi, 2013; Silberman, Alba and Fournier, 2007). The overwhelming majority of paired-testing audits
conducted in France during the last decade hence use North or sub-Saharan Africans as the potentially
discriminated group. More recently, some studies have focused on religious discrimination against Mus-
lim origin (Adida, Laitin and Valfort, 2014). Although France’s first anti-discrimination law dates back
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to 1972, state-level anti-discrimination action has traditionally been weak and fragmented. In 2004, the
French government created a centralized anti-discrimination agency (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les
Discriminations et pour l’Egalité) in a context of growing concerns related to discrimination in the po-
litical and scientific debates. The HALDE was however dismantled in 2011 and specific action towards
racial and ethnic discrimination has been increasingly re-framed into a more general discourse promoting
diversity (Bereni and Jaunait, 2009; Doytcheva, 2010).
1.3 In search of “residential discrimination” in the housing market: Disentan-
gling residential and ethnic effects
The majority of testing studies draw on the distinction between taste-based and statistical discriminations
and are designed so as to empirically disentangle the two underlying processes. In the housing market
in particular, statistical discrimination is tested for by adding information to the applicant’s profile (see,
for instance, Bosch, Carnero and Farre, 2010; Ewens, Tomlin and Wang, 2014). However, these studies
frame only one criterion as being potentially discriminatory (namely ethnic/racial or immigrant back-
ground), while other added information is not regarded as possibly bringing another source of unequal
treatment. Our study thus adds to the literature by reflecting on the relationship between two potentially
discriminatory criteria that may affect housing outcomes. More specifically, we aim to test for three
hypotheses:
• Hypothesis one (H1): Real estate agents are primarily concerned with insolvency and they use
any potentially relevant information about the applicants as proxies to make inferences about their
unobserved solvency. In other words, ethnic and residential origins may lead to statistical discrimi-
nation (Phelps, 1972), given the significant legal constraints in place on the French housing market.
These constraints motivate landlords to select tenants on financial grounds, under the prior that the
complexity of the rules on eviction and the financial cost for landlords are both associated with the
risk of default on the rent.
• Hypothesis two (H2): ethnic discrimination and residential discrimination both exist and are com-
bined through an additive effect on overall discrimination, with no particular interaction between
them. Given this, real estate agents will engage in pure discrimination against a given type of
neighborhood. This would be an instance of taste discrimination against a neighborhood (H2).
Taste discrimination may be directly related to the prevalence of anti-minority prejudice (Allport,
1954), or, in Becker’s words, it may stem from a tendency on the part of agents to sacrifice profit
or other rational objectives in favor of more frequent interactions with co-ethnics (Becker, 1971).
• Hypothesis three (H3): the neighborhood does not matter per se: agents merely use the information
about the neighborhood to infer an applicant’s race or ethnicity. What appears as discrimination
against a neighborhood is in fact discrimination against racial or ethnic minorities. Legal scholars
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call this indirect discrimination (Hunter, 1992): the use of legally unprotected characteristics to
achieve legally forbidden discrimination.
Our research design aims to examine these three different hypotheses, which are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, by disentangling ethnic and residential stigma in the measurement of discrimination.
2 Research design: The complementary use of qualitative and quan-
titative frameworks
Direct accounts of discrimination in the social sciences usually fall into two categories (Blank, Dabady
and Citro, 2004; Pager and Shepherd, 2008):
• Analyses of discriminatory attitudes, behaviors and discourses: studies that focus on the cognitive
and social mechanisms underlying the construction of prejudice, which may lead to discriminatory
acts (Fiske, 2000; Schuman et al., 1997).
• Measurements of discriminatory practices: studies that seek to uncover actual discrimination as a
“caught-in-the-act case” through experimental situations in order to measure its magnitude, evolu-
tion and consequences (Fix and Struyk, 1993; Pager, 2007) following standard procedures of the
HUD described in Online Appendix A1.
Only a few studies mobilize both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. These have led to contra-
dictory results, showing that what people say or think with regard to discrimination is not coherent with
what they actually do. This was the main finding of LaPiere (1934)’s classic study of discrimination in
hotels (people discriminate less than they express prejudice). More recently, Pager and Quillian (2005)
have conducted a similar study that shows the opposite discrepancy between attitudes and actions (people
discriminate more than they exhibit prejudice). In both cases, the authors’ interpretations are inclined to
trust the experimental measurement of discrimination acts, whereas people’s attitudes are often regarded
as doubtful.5 The two methodologies of inquiring into discrimination are thus presented as concurrent
rather than complementary.
In this article, we first use an audit testing strategy to explore the association between residential
and ethnic effects, and then we conduct a qualitative survey to assess the prevalence of ethnic or/and
residential stigma and how these stigma may affect real-estate agents’ decision with regard to tenants’
selection. It should be noted that, unlike other studies that combine testing methods with qualitative
interviews while measuring discrimination, our qualitative and quantitative samples are not matched. We
thus do not audit the people we interview. We believe that this is inconsequential to our argument because
we constructed our sample of respondents for the qualitative study and of agencies for our audit study on
the same principles. We selected richer and poorer neighborhoods in Paris and the surrounding region
5Economists call this a logic of revealed preferences, after Samuelson (1938).
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where we audited agencies, and contacted interview respondents in richer and poorer neighborhoods in
Paris and the surrounding region advertising the same type of goods as the audited agencies.
3 Measuring the intersection between ethnic and residential dis-
crimination factors: An audit study on the Parisian rental mar-
ket
3.1 The audit study6
Our audit study was carried out in March and April 2009. A team of eight individuals, aged 22 to 28, two
women and six men (hereafter the “testers”), made a total of 500 phone calls to real-estate agencies for
250 different housing vacancies in the Paris region. We collected advertisements for housing units from
the website http://www.seloger.com, the leading internet platform at the time of the study.
The test was designed to detect the effect of two potentially discriminatory criteria: the current place
of residence (deprived neighborhood) of the fictitious applicant, and ethnic origin (North African back-
ground) as revealed by the applicant’s name. Testers were matched by pairs: each tester thus had a
co-tester with whom he/she worked most of the time. They were instructed not to fake any particular
accent during the phone conversations.7 Testers were assigned fictitious identities, which included a
name, a place of residence, an occupation and an income level. These were designed to reflect a typical
middle-class housing applicant, for instance: “Sébastien Fournier (French name) / Kader Boualem (North
African name), lives in La Courneuve (deprived suburb) / Versailles (rich suburb), is 31 years old, works
as an accountant and earns a monthly wage of 1,700 euros”. These fictitious identities also included a
marital status (married with no children), an occupation and an income for the spouse.
As it was possible neither to test all combinations of geographic and ethnic origins on the same
advertised dwelling nor to reveal all the relevant information within a phone conversation, we limited the
number of scenarios and designed two different procedures:
• In the first procedure (173 audits), each tester revealed his/her fictitious place of residence at the
beginning of the conversation and, as the conversation proceeded, he/she eventually gave his/her
name.
• The second procedure (77 audits) was similar but reversed: the fictitious name was revealed first,
with the tester then attempting to provide information on his/her current location, without forcing
matters.
6A comprehensive description of our audit study can be found in Appendix A of the Online Appendix.
7This rule reflected a trade-off: introducing accent would have increased unobserved heterogeneity (arbitrariness and thus
randomness) in the perception interpretations. Preventing accents likely biased downwards the intensity of discrimination.
See Section A.4 of the Online Appendix for further discussions.
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The phone conversations that resulted from these procedures usually developed as follows: in the very
first sentence, the tester expressed his/her interest in the advertised dwelling. Here are examples of the
introductory sentences testers would use:
• In procedure #1: “Hello, I’m calling about your ad for the apartment located in City X. I’m really
interested in renting this apartment since I need to move from city of the applicant where I currently
live to get closer to my job. Is it still available?”
• In procedure #2: “Hello, name of the applicant speaking. I’m calling about your ad no. X found
on the internet. I’m really interested in the apartment in the ad because I need to move closer to
my job. Is this still available?”
A typical conversation would then proceed as follows:
• If the apartment was still available, the applicant would then ask for an appointment to view it.
The rental broker would potentially ask for more information about the applicant, and the tester
attempted to provide his/her name (Procedure #1) or his/her place of residence (Procedure #2).
• If the apartment was no longer available, the rental broker would generally ask some additional de-
tails to determine whether another apartment might meet the applicant’s needs, or would terminate
the conversation quickly.
The resulting phone conversations were thus short, focusing on the candidate’s profile and usually homo-
geneous across testers and procedures. In all cases, the testers could collect information about the rent,
the surface area and the location of the apartment from the internet advertisement.
Following the phone call, the testers reported the outcomes of the conversation, which were coded as
follows:
Code Outcome
1 Apartment is already rented, nothing else available
2 Caller is asked to send a written application with personal details
3 Real -estate agent will call back, but no return call
4 Apartment is already rented but something else is available
5 Real-estate agent plans a group visit
6 Real-estate agent plans an individual visit
These coding schemes were the outcome of several days of trials on about 50 calls (which are not
included in our sample of audits). Overall, they proved sufficiently comprehensive for testers to report
the outcomes of the different phone conversations without being concerned that a relevant category was
missing.
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Figure 1. Outcomes of the phone conversations
NOTE: The figure represents in percentage the different possible outcomes of the phone conversations, under the first and the
second procedure (residence revealed first and ethnicity revealed first, respectively). All applications are pooled together.
3.2 Outcomes of the phone conversations
Figure 1 compares the distribution of outcomes of the phone conversations obtained under the two pro-
cedures, initially ignoring the paired-testing dimension of the experiment, pooling all applicants. Those
reveal similarities, suggesting that differences in the introductory sentence used by testers did not sig-
nificantly alter the interaction with the rental agent. In other words, in both procedures, the fictitious
applicants were able to arrange an individual viewing with the rental broker most of the time (35 to 40%
of all phone calls), and they were also likely to be told that the rental agent would call them back (32 and
35% of all phone calls).
3.3 Detecting discrimination: Differences in outcomes across paired phone con-
versations
To simplify the presentation of the results, we group occurrences 1, 2 and 3 as “negative answers” and
4, 5 and 6 as “positive answers”.8 We use the term “minority candidate” to refer to an applicant from a
8As rightly noticed by a referee, Code 4 (advertised unit was unavailable but “something else” was offered) could be
interpreted as either “some discrimination” or “steering”, and therefore aggregated with codes 1, 2 and 3 (“rather negative
outcome”). Since there were few occurrence of this outcome (Figure 1), we adopt as a benchmark the aggregation of Code
4 with Codes 5 and 6 (rather favorable). In Appendix B of the Online Appendix, we repeat our estimations after aggregating
Code 4 with Codes 1 to 3. We also re-run our estimations after excluding applications involving the occurrence of Code 4.
None of these checks alter the findings presented in this section.
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deprived suburb in the first procedure and to an applicant with a North African name in the second pro-
cedure. Note that the minority candidate in, for instance, the second procedure may have been assigned
a fictitious residence in a privileged suburb: the term “minority” refers only to the information revealed
first during the conversation. Accordingly, the paired-tester is labeled the “majority candidate”.
In Table 1, we cross-tabulate the outcomes of the two candidates obtained through each procedure
(residence first, or ethnicity first). The full results are displayed in Tables B1 and B2 of Online Appendix
B. In each panel, the first number is the number of cases and the second number is the frequency, i.e. the
number of cases divided by the total number of cases studied. The on-diagonal coefficients report the
number of cases where the minority and majority candidates were equally treated, at least when grouping
the different outcomes. For instance, in the first procedure (Panel a.) this occurred in 26.6% + 34.7%
= 61.3% of all cases. The off-diagonal coefficients report unequal treatment, in the remaining 38.7%
of cases. The upper-right cell reports cases where the minority candidates was treated better than the
majority candidate, which occurred in just 13.9% of cases. In contrast, the lower-left cell reports cases
where the majority candidate was treated better than the minority candidate. This occurred in 24.9% of
cases.
Table 1. Cross-tabulation of the outcomes across paired phone calls
a. Procedure #1 (residence first) Outcome of the minority candidate
Rather negative (1,2,3) Rather positive (4,5,6) Total
Outcome of the majority candidate
Rather negative (1,2,3) 46 (26.6%) 24 (13.9%) 70 (40.5%)
Rather positive (4,5,6) 43 (24.9%) 60 (34.7%) 103 (59.5%)
Total 89 (51.5%) 84 (48.6%) 173
b. Procedure #2 (ethnicity first) Outcome of the minority candidate
Rather negative (1,2,3) Rather positive (4,5,6) Total
Outcome of the majority candidate
Rather negative (1,2,3) 30 (39.0%) 11 (14.3%) 41 (53.3%)
Rather positive (4,5,6) 7 (9.1%) 29 (37.7%) 36 (46.8%)
Total 37 (48.1%) 40 (52.0%) 77
In the second experiment, where ethnicity was revealed first (Panel b.), discrimination appears to be
much less significant. In fact, the on-diagonal cases now constitute 76.7% of cases, i.e. those in which
the minority and majority candidates are treated equally. The off-diagonal coefficients reporting unequal
treatment reveal that the minority candidate was treated better than the majority candidate in 14.3% of
cases, while the majority candidate was treated better in 9.1% of cases, that is, in fewer cases.
We can summarize the information in Table 1 by computing the discrimination rates displayed in
Table 2.
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Table 2. Discrimination rates under the two procedures
Procedure #1 (residence first) Procedure #2 (ethnicity first)
NM/N 24.86% [18.42%, 31.30%] 9.10% [2.67%, 15.51%]
Nm/N 13.87% [8.72%, 19.02%] 14.29% [6.47%, 22. 10%]
z-statistic 2.585 -1.003
p-value 0.0097 0.3157
NOTE: NM (resp. Nm) denotes the number of audits in which majority (resp. minority) candidate obtains a positive outcome
while the minority candidate (resp. majority) does not. Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals. The p-value is
associated to the null hypothesis that the relative difference NM−Nm/N is significantly different from 0.
These discrimination rates confirm that a candidate from the deprived suburb was significantly less
likely to have a positive response in the first procedure relative to his/her paired applicant, while there
was no significant evidence of discrimination against the candidate with a North African name in the
second procedure (some finding even suggesting positive treatment). The next subsection examines the
robustness of these initial results.
3.4 Robust assessment of the presence of discrimination
We now test different specifications that use the panel structure of our dataset to analyze whether the
phone conversations reveal discrimination against minority candidates. These specifications are variants
of a linear probability model that accounts for the probability of obtaining a positive outcome. The
generic model that we consider is:
yi,a = za + γdi,a +βXi,a + εi,a (1)
where yi,a is an indicator taking the value of 1 if Applicant i obtains a favorable outcome in Audit a, za is
a set of variables that characterize the paired audit, di,a is a dummy with the value of 1 if the applicant is
the minority candidate, and Xi,a is a set of controls that characterizes Tester i in Audit a. In the baseline
model, za includes some characteristics of the advertised dwelling, such as the surface, the rent, etc.
We then drop these in favor of audit fixed effects. Tables 3a and 3b report the results of these different
regressions.
The regressions in Tables 3a and 3b confirm the rough calculations in Table 2: the applicant from the
deprived suburb in the first procedure (residence first) experiences more than a 10 percentage point drop
in the probability of obtaining a favorable outcome. The coefficient is precisely estimated and robust
to the set of controls included in the regression. Interestingly, there is no evidence of less favorable
treatment of the minority candidate in the second procedure: having an Arab name has no significant
impact on the probability of obtaining a viewing.
In the first procedure (residence first), subsequently revealing the name led to a significantly higher
outcome, regardless of the ethnicity of the name. This may be a mere statistical correlation and not a
causal link, as it occurred only when the candidate was able to arrange a meeting for the viewing, i.e.
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Table 3a. Estimation results: Procedure #1 (residence first)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Deprived suburb -0.1440 -0.1387 -0.1387 -0.1098 -0.1227 -0.1301 -0.1373
(0.0638) (0.0564) (0.0564) (0.0468) (0.0480) (0.0522) (0.0520)
Minority name 0.0567 0.0152 0.0152 0.1273 0.1046
(North Africa) (0.1110) (0.1004) (0.1004) (0.0924) (0.0939)
Name revealed 0.2431 0.1788 0.1788 0.2415 0.2373
(0.0987) (0.0833) (0.0833) (0.0997) (0.1009)
Name revealed -0.0932 0.0110 0.0110 -0.1888 -0.1747
x Minority Name (0.1276) (0.1123) (0.1123) (0.1175) (0.1161)
Controls:
Individual call Y Y Y Y Y
Vacancy characteristics Y Y Y
City level dummies Y Y
Fixed effects
Audit level Y Y Y Y
Pairs of testers Y Y
Individual testers Y Y
N 327 327 327 346 346 345 345
R2 0.7371 0.5972 0.5972 0.0311 0.0443 0.0668 0.0775
R2 with fixed effect 0.8264 0.8288 0.8352 0.8370
NOTE: Estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level are in boldface. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the audit level. Each column reports the coefficients γ and β estimated along with a specific set of
controls for each procedure. Name revealed is a dummy indicating whether the tester revealed his/her name in the phone
conversation. Characteristics at the level of the individual phone calls are: a dummy indicating whether the tester used the
phone line with a number starting with 09 (indicating Internet box) and a dummy indicating whether he/she called first.
Vacancy characteristics include the rent and the surface of the advertised dwelling. City level dummies are dummies at the
level of the city when the dwelling is located outside of Paris or, otherwise, at the level of arrondissements.
when a positive outcome had been obtained. A name of North African origin is negative but not signifi-
cant, or only very marginally, in Columns (VI) and (VII). In terms of the other potentially discriminatory
criterion (North African name in the first procedure, deprived suburb in the second procedure), we find
no significant impact when this was revealed to the rental agent. This may be due to the lower number
of observations in the second procedure, which may affect the significance of the coefficients. To verify
that this is not the case, we replicated the regression with a bootstrap procedure (500 times) randomly
selecting 77 pairs of calls from the 177 initial pairs in the first procedure. The full results, reported in
Table B3 of Online Appendix B, reveal that the conclusions above still hold: the negative effect of living
in a deprived suburb remains true in all columns. The significance level is reduced: this is now 10% in
four out of seven specifications, and marginally less significant in the other three specifications.9
9This result is not surprising in the first procedure given that Procedure #2 shows that having a North African name does
not go against the minority candidate. Conversely, the fact that living in a deprived area has no significant impact in the second
procedure may seem puzzling given the robust effect obtained from Procedure #1. This may be due to the small number of
phone calls in the second procedure, during which the applicant from the deprived suburb managed to reveal this information
to the rental agent (16 cases out of the 154 phone calls).
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Table 3b. Estimation results: Procedure #2 (ethnicity first)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Minority name 0.0299 -0.1076 -0.1118 0.0519 0.0484 0.0502 0.0419
(0.0785) (0.1776) (0.1984) (0.0553) (0.0604) (0.0624) (0.0728)
Deprived suburb 0.0468 0.0481 0.0768 0.0261 0.0298
(0.0821) (0.0768) (0.0765) (0.0706) (0.0715)
Residence revealed 0.1001 0.3255 0.2365 0.0686 0.1148
(0.2553) (0.2494) (0.2499) (0.2213) (0.2578)
Residence revealed -0.2307 -0.3588 -0.4082 -0.1434 -0.1837
x Deprived suburb (0.2713) (0.2887) (0.3109) (0.2361) (0.2742)
Controls:
Individual call Y Y Y Y Y
Vacancy characteristics Y Y Y
City level dummies Y Y
Fixed effects
Audit level Y Y Y Y
Pairs of testers Y Y
Individual testers Y Y
N 144 144 144 154 154 154 154
R2 0.6295 0.5789 0.6358 0.0115 0.0194 0.0191 0.0305
R2 with fixed effect 0.8771 0.8787 0.8780 0.8801
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the audit level. Each column reports the coefficients γ
and β estimated along with a specific set of controls for each procedure. Residence revealed is a dummy indicating whether
the tester revealed his/her residential origin in the phone conversation. Characteristics at the level of the individual phone
calls are: a dummy indicating whether the tester used the phone line with a number starting with 09 (indicating Internet box)
and a dummy indicating whether he/she called first. Vacancy characteristics include the rent and the surface of the advertised
dwelling. City level dummies are dummies at the level of the city when the dwelling is located outside of Paris or, otherwise,
at the level of arrondissements.
4 “Whom do you discriminate against?” Asking real-estate agents
The qualitative part of this paper was designed to confirm, or at least verify, whether the surprising
result of the audit testing strategy would be perceived by agents themselves, and whether they would
be conscious of the apparent importance of residence in the outcome. It fact it tells a different story,
however, which has the added interest of revealing the importance of employing different methodologies.
4.1 Interviewing real estate agents
This involved 29 face-to-face semi-directive interviews with real-estate agents in Paris and the surround-
ing region, conducted between June and October 2010. Each interview lasted at least one hour.10
These interviews first reveal that, while the overwhelming majority of agents tend to deny any form
of discrimination in their own decisions, they have a lot to say about the functioning of the market in
10For more information about the interviews, please refer to Online Appendix C.
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general and about other agencies’ discriminatory actions in particular.
4.2 Ethnic and racial discrimination is everywhere. . . but not here!
Perhaps unexpectedly, interviewees felt comfortable talking about discrimination without our expressly
mentioning the term. As soon as the section about the “ideal candidate” began, the word “discrimination”
arose naturally in the discussion, and was systematically associated with ethnic or racial dimensions. The
issue of ethnic or racial discrimination was spontaneously raised by 13 interviewees (out of 29) without
any overt questioning by the interviewer. In all these cases, discrimination was directly associated to
ethnic and racial criteria, with skin color (or African origin) being most commonly cited.
Table 4 shows the recurrence of words referring to ethnic/racial criteria, distinguishing whether these
were used by the interviewees or the interviewers. Interviewer and respondent used the word “origin”
with equal frequency, whereas words indicative of ethnicity were predominantly used by interviewees.
On average, the words reported in Table 4 are used more than twice as frequently by the interviewee.
Table 4. Recurrence of words referring to ethnic/racial criteria in the interviews
Respondent Interviewer Ratio
Turk(s) 23 2 11.5
Africa, African, etc. 36 4 9.0
Black(s) 105 20 5.3
Arab(s) 26 6 4.3
White(s) 37 11 3.4
Race, racial 14 7 2.0
Racist, racism 45 23 2.0
Foreigner(s) 45 29 1.6
Origin 52 56 0.9
Ethnic, ethnicity 19 26 0.7
Total 402 184 2.2
Total per interview 13.9 6.3 2.2
Even though real-estate agents spoke extensively about ethnic and racial discrimination, they sys-
tematically denounced it as “bad” and “illegal” and denied the existence of such practices in their own
agency.
Well I have people, blacks, who came to the agency and they told me, err. . . So I welcomed
them and they told me, “We just got sent on our way by – well, I won’t tell their name, an
agency not far from here” [he laughs] and err. . . they’ve been told, “No, no Sir, we have
nothing to rent”. They had just arrived, and they were told, “We have nothing to rent”.
They most frequently blamed the landlords for pushing real-estate agents to discriminate against minori-
ties, but said that whenever they had to deal with such landlords, they refused to comply. Besides the fact
that all testimonies converge on the salience of discrimination against black and Arab minorities, some
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real-estate agents provide the interviewer with objective figures quantifying such practices, saying that
almost 10% of rental offers come with discriminatory recommendations from landlords (“I don’t want
Arabs, blacks, etc.”).
- Do you have recent experience of verbal complaint?
- Yeah, it happened maybe one year ago: someone went to complain to the person in charge
of rentals.
- What do you say in those situations?
- Well, we tell them we have presented the application to the landlord, and the landlord
decides. We can’t do anything about it. Because if we really did refuse that kind of persons,
according to me we are all people, no matter the color, we are all human beings, therefore
this behavior makes me mad. If the person is working, I don’t see where there is a problem.
We can see the kind of people we’re dealing with. Now we can’t force landlords. But we
won’t refuse to these people viewings.
- And if you had to assess the percentage of racist demands?
- Yes, you can say that. It’s not the majority, but not matter how small. . . I don’t know, 10%?
Real-estate agents often imply that they understand the landlords’ aversion to certain profiles which
experience has proven unreliable (e.g. resulting in unpaid rent, sublease, damage). This argument builds
even more explicitly on statistical discrimination.
The landlord asks us to avoid certain categories of population. We don’t have the right to do
that. We can’t practice racism like that. Otherwise, we would only get into big trouble. But,
it is true that. . . Experience is such that we avoid certain categories of people because we
realize that with those categories we always have problems.
Let’s say that experience suggests that. . . we will be more careful with certain categories
than with others.
In short, when asked about the selection of applicants for housing rentals, real-estate agents find racial
discrimination the obvious issue. However, they overtly condemn racial discrimination, describe it as
a problem for landlords rather than the real-estate business itself. Some agents exhibit understanding
attitudes toward forms of discrimination which they find rational, while others find the practice of dis-
criminating on racial grounds economically irrational. But they all see racial discrimination as the issue
at stake.
4.3 Looking for residence-based discrimination
In stark contrast, none of the respondents spontaneously mentioned residential stigma. The interview was
planned so that the interviewer asked this question at the end of the conversation, after a lot of discussion
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of discriminatory practices and the motivation behind them. The question was formulated thus: “There is
much debate about ethnic and racial discrimination but do you think that other criteria might be at play,
for example residential ones?”, and “If a candidates comes from an underprivileged neighborhood, the
suburbs, etc. do you think this may disadvantage him/her on the renting market?”
This question seem disconcerting for most real-estate agents. An overwhelming majority could sim-
ply not see why residence might have any impact. Almost all respondents said that they paid no heed
to where a candidate lives. Some of them asserted that they rarely check the candidate’s address when
they are examining him/her, and claim that they would not know in what kind of neighborhood a given
address is located. Only two respondents elaborated on this question further, mentioning association with
linguistic stigma: according to them, the problem is not the area of residence itself, but the fact that peo-
ple from these neighborhoods do “not express themselves well” or have a “particular accent”. Only one
single respondent admitted that some locations (and he/she cited the most stigmatized French suburbs)
can disadvantage candidates, although he/she then gave an example of labor market discrimination, not
housing.
5 The paradox: A discussion
The comparison of our audit and interview findings leads to a double paradox:
1. Real-state agents clearly deny the relevance of residence as a discriminatory factor in the housing
market, while quantitative evidence tends to show that it has a significant disadvantaging effect in
access to housing.
2. Ethnic origin does not have a significant impact when the area of residence is controlled for in
the exploitation of the audit study data, while real-estate agents report that it has an indisputable
discriminatory impact.
Thus, the widespread ethnic discrimination identified by real-estate agents is not statistically significant
in the audit study that controls for residence, while residential discrimination, which is not deemed im-
portant by real-estate agents, is statistically significant in the same study.
The qualitative interviews lead to the elimination of one of the three hypotheses posited in Section 1.3,
which suggested that there may exist a form of pure discrimination against a type of area of residence.
The real-estate agents we interviewed never mentioned this, either directly or indirectly.11 Furthermore,
there is no reason to assume that this might be an effect of a social desirability bias in these responses,
as real-estate agents are not shy about documenting racial discrimination, which is more controversial.
We now discuss whether the remaining two hypotheses (hypotheses H1 and H3) are consistent with the
double paradox revealed above.
11One may suspect this result to be biased since real-estate agents may have denied the existence of residential discrimi-
nation in order to be categorical as to their not accepting any type of illegal bias. However, at the time of the interviews, only
racial discrimination was both illegal and subject to testing by associations; this was not the case of residential discrimination.
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Discussion of H1: “Statistical discrimination through proxying applicants’ solvency”
The first hypothesis suggested that real-estate agents are primarily concerned with insolvency and that
any correlates with insolvency (including residential or ethnic origins) may lead to biases in tenant selec-
tion through statistical discrimination mechanisms (i.e. the combination of information about ethnicity
and residence interacts in signalling low socioeconomic background, which translates into a marker of
greater likelihood of insolvency, leading real-estate agents’ decision to go against these applicants). This
hypothesis is in line with former studies highlighting that the French housing market legal framework
may be overly protective of tenants,12 which leads to increasing concerns on the part of landlords about
a potential default on rent payment.13
This hypothesis may appear to be consistent with the double paradox and it is also in line with a
prevailing political and scientific belief that, unlike in the U.S.A., ethnicity and race are less prominent
inequality factors in France (Wacquant, 2008). In other words, the nonsignificant effect of ethnicity when
residential origin is controlled for can be read as a demonstration of the supremacy of class over race in
generating social inequality in France, thus reducing the disadvantage experienced by ethnic minorities
to socio-economic and “color-blind” factors. Within this framework, the double paradox in our findings
is no more a paradox, but could be interpreted as evidence that residential location is used as a proxy for
insolvency or “bad tenant” (and not for “race”) and that real-estate agents perceive white applicants
from “bad” neighborhoods just as negatively as minority applicants from “bad” neighborhoods.
While this interpretation is appealing, it should be noted that it is not directly established by our find-
ings but rather stems from a speculative explanation building on prior studies on the legal environment
surrounding the French housing market. It may appear, nonetheless, to stand in contradiction with grow-
ing empirical evidence on ethnic and racial inequality in France documented in diverse social spheres
(labor and housing markets, schooling and education, spatial segregation, health, access to law and pub-
lic services, etc.). In fact, the contradiction is not so straightforward because hypothesis H1 could also be
read in line with the sociological concept of systemic or indirect discrimination (Bonilla-Silva, 2013): the
legal structure of the housing market in France could lead to systematic ethnic bias, even though its driv-
ing mechanisms may not be directly oriented toward ethnic minorities. All in all, if residential origin is a
powerful proxy for insolvency, it indirectly undermines ethnic minorities’ chances on the rental housing
market simply because ethnic minorities are highly concentrated in disadvantaged neighborhoods.
12We have observed, in this context and in other studies (Bonnet et al., 2011), that landlords are very cautious in their
selection of tenants, probably because the French legal environment makes evictions a long and difficult process, with various
steps to undergo when attempting to prosecute tenants for failure to pay rent, a process which can involve delays of several
months before a court decision is handed down and the scarce execution of eviction decisions. We incidentally noticed that
some landlords discriminate against lawyers, who may easily delay procedures.
13According to the European Community Household Panel (1994-2002), 10.6% of tenants self-reported in the survey that
they had experienced a default on the rent in the last year. Some of these defaults were only temporary, but others were
recurrent cases of default.
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Discussion of H3: “Neighborhood as a proxy for ethnicity”
The other hypothesis is that the residential stigma is a proxy for an ethnic stigma. This is all the more
likely given that the degree of ethnic concentration is high in the areas chosen for our audit study. In
this case, ethnicity is the signal that affects real-estate agents’ decisions when selecting from applicants,
and information about place of residence is used as a proxy for ethnic origin. Moreover, even if resi-
dential origin is translated into ethnic origin in real-estate agents’ minds, it may be more conducive to
discriminatory decisions than overt information about ethnic origin (such as, for instance, an African
name) because of a less pronounced desirability bias involved in residential discrimination. This may ex-
plain the fact that, in our data, the negative impact of ethnicity becomes less powerful when the applicant
presents his/her residence first.
This assumption challenges the “cumulative perception” of stigmas according to which one disad-
vantaging factor would simply add a discriminatory effect to the other. Instead of this additive effect
(residence would disadvantage everyone, but ethnic minority candidates are the worst off), our findings
suggest that one variable (residence) may be a substitute for the other (ethnicity), thus making its effect
redundant, especially when residence is the first of the two pieces of information revealed in a potentially
discriminatory interaction. It is also important to note that this redundancy appears to take shape through
a proxying process. Some elements in the interviews support the fact that residence may be used as a
proxy for ethnicity, and in fact the very few interviewees who elaborated on the question about residen-
tial discrimination mentioned “cultural arguments” directly linked to ethnic origin: fluency and accent in
French.
Overall, hypothesis H3 helps us to understand the results related to the effect of geographic origin
in the regressions performed on the phone conversations from Procedure #2: because ethnic origin has
already been revealed at the beginning of the conversation, the proxying process of ethnicity through
residence is not activated. However, this still does not solve the puzzle of the lack of significance of
the ethnic origin variable in the procedure where ethnicity is revealed first to the real-estate agent and
residence later. Possible explanations may draw on the weakness of names in proxying ethnicity in
France.14 Residential origin may therefore be a more effective proxy of ethnicity. Using in-person testers
can be a useful strategy to eliminate this possible proxying process and better disentangle the effects of
ethnic and residential origins while measuring discrimination.
Our approach inevitably presents certain limitations. A housing search involves several steps, and
this audit study analyzes only the first stage in the process. Whilst this would be problematic were we
measuring the overall level of discrimination, we believe that it is adequate for our less ambitious purpose,
namely that of detecting the existence of discriminatory practices. These are readily visible in the first
14Names have been frequently used in paired-testing audit in France to signal ethnic origin and have been proven to have
significant discriminatory effects. However, some recent quantitative analyses suggest that experiences of discrimination in
France are also very common among “visible minorities” (Beauchemin et al., 2010) and may thus indicate that testing studies
should try to measure discrimination through personal interactions. Personal interactions nevertheless increase methodological
vulnerability of testing studies because of the well-known problem of individual heterogeneity.
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contact between housing applicants and real-estate agents.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the urban literature on residential segregation by providing empirical support
for the argument that living in a given neighborhood may hinder households’ residential mobility. The ar-
ticle thus contributes to the scholarship on place-based exclusion, which has already been documented in
relation to redlining (Aalbers, 2007) and steering (Galster and Godfrey, 2005), by adding the rental mar-
ket dimension. From a methodological perspective, it reveals a discrepancy between the results obtained
using two different methods (audit and face-to-face interviews). This may be due to the unconscious
nature of some discriminating acts, which face-to-face interviews should address in one way or another.
It may also challenge the relevance of measuring interaction between discriminatory factors. The un-
derlying framework of such studies is dominated by the cumulative or additive disadvantage paradigm.
However, when two stigmas are so interconnected in social representations, substitution mechanisms can
take place when one stigma proxies another. Further research should therefore explore the implications
of such proxying processes on the measurement of discrimination.
From a substantive point of view, our dual research protocol has enabled us to discard one of our
three hypotheses: the idea of pure residential discrimination does not make sense. Two non-exclusive
hypotheses remain: a hypothesis of statistical discrimination whereby real-estate agents make inferences
about insolvency through information about residence, and a hypothesis that there is purely ethnic dis-
crimination where residence is a proxy for race/ethnicity. Further research combining qualitative insights
and systematic data may help us resolve this.
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